The distinction of two types of information processing,
one fast and automatic, the other slow and deliberative, has a long tradition and reaches back to
ancient times. Theories making this dichotomous distinction
are summarized under the term ‘dual process
theories’ and all share the premise that human behavior
is controlled by two qualitatively different modes of
processing, automatic, referred to as Type 1 processing,
and controlled, referred to as Type 2 processing. These
two forms of processing are specified by their reliance
on attentional control that can be defined as the goaldirected
allocation of cognitive processing resources to
internal and external stimuli. Type 1 processing is independent
of working memory capacity, as Type 1 processing
is both initiated and completed in the presence
of relevant triggering conditions. On the other hand,
Type 2 processing depends on available working memory
capacity for hypothetical thinking and mental simulation.
Within Type 1 processes, the response/solution
to a problem has become part of its cognitive representation.
For example, when solving a simple equation
like 212 or when an experienced track-and-field athlete
crosses hurdles, the solution to the problems is triggered
by the context without requiring further
controlled processing, as it is part of the cognitive
representation of that problem. The solution has
become part of the cognitive representation as a consequence
of practice and learning. Type 2 processes are
required either to override a triggered response that is
part of a representation or for a response to a novel
problem that has never become part of a representation;
e.g., when solving the equation 1578 47. Type 2 processes
can also be triggered by the context, but only
Type 1 processes autonomously run to completion.
Type 2 processes might be initiated autonomously but
subsequently require working memory engagement to
be completed. Working memory engagement is not an
all-or-nothing criterion, but can vary depending on the
task demands. Therefore, Type 2 processes should be
defined along a continuum regarding their demands on
working memory.
Different dual-processes models can be categorized
into three groups, depending on how they conceptualize
how both kinds of processing interact: preemptive models,
parallel-competitive models, and defaultinterventionist
models. Preemptive models assume that
one kind of processing must be selected before a task.
Parallel-competitive models assume that both kinds of
processing compete during the entire task. Defaultinterventionist
models assume that Type 1 processing is
the default mode that is always activated when confronted
with a given situation. Type 2 processing is
only additionally activated when Type 1 processing
does not reach a solution or when additional contextual
information casts doubt on the initially triggered solution.
Current research favors the default-interventionist
framework.
Recently, dual-process theories, and in particular the
default-interventionist framework, has been transferred
to sport (Furley, Schweizer, & Bertrams, 2015). Sport
performance often requires Type 1 processing as time
pressure does not allow for the effortful controlled
Type 2 processing and Type 2 processing even has the
potential to disturb athletic performance as predicted
by the paralysis-by-analysis hypothesis. Practice in
sports is undertaken to circumvent the limitations of
the slow effortful Type 2 processing and automate
behaviors as the cognitive demands during skill execution
decrease with continuous practice. However,
skilled sport performers are required to alternate
between controlled and automatic modes of processing
in order to meet the demands presented by complex
environments.
